Memorandum

To:	Presiding Judge Marion T. Pope, Jr.
From:	William L. Martin, III
Subject:	Senate Bills 71, 72, 73, 74 and 75
Date:	January 7, 1998

Attached please find the bills about which Senator Mike Egan's office contacted me relative to Committee Hearings scheduled for the week of January 19, 1998. Senate Bill 72 and Senate Bill 73 could have a direct impact upon our Court.

Senate Bill 72 would amend §5-6-46 to add a new subsection (e) to provide that the appellate court in which the notice of appeal is filed shall entertain motions for specific applications of supersedeas and may issue interim orders to serve the ends of justice. The motion for supersedeas , if sought, must be filed together with the notice of appeal or within ten days of the date of docketing the notice of appeal if the moving party is appellee. This subsection will require the Court to issue a ruling on such motions within 25 days of the date of docketing of the notice of appeal.

First of all, the notice of appeal is not filed in the appellate courts, but is filed in the trial court. I am unsure if the act is referring to an application rather than a notice of appeal, because all of the above bills tend to deal with juvenile and custody matters.

Also, I am not sure how the repealer in Senate Bill 72 will effect subsection (a) which the Court had passed in 1994. That code section gave the trial court the concurrent jurisdiction to deal with supersedeas bonds when requested. It is my understanding that subsection was amended to relieve this Court from the burden of having to remand the case to the trial court after the appeal was docketed with us to make a determination on the supersedeas .

If subsection (e) becomes law, the Court of Appeals will then be put in the posture of having to conduct evidentiary hearings, something we are not set up to do, nor am I sure, we are authorized to do under the Constitution.

Finally, the time frames are totally unreasonable, assuming that the Court would hear the motions. Unless it is a one judge order, there is no way that our Court can guarantee that the matter would be ruled upon within 25 days, particularly if there is a dissent.

Senate Bill 73 would add new language to subsection (g) of O.C.G.A §5-6-35. The new language would require in any granted application that the Court of Appeals expedite the matter and render a disposition of the case within 90 days from the date of oral argument, or if no oral argument, within 90 days of the date that appellee's brief or cross appellee's brief is filed.

Currently, there are already statutory requirements and internal policy requirements of the Court which require expedited treatment of appeals. O.C.G.A. §9-10-1 requires the Court to expedite, as the first priority, any civil case in which the State is a plaintiff. O.C.G.A. §5- 6-43(c) requires the Court to expedite any criminal appeal in which the defendant is incarcerated. The Parental Notification Act codified at O.C.G.A. §15-11-110 et seq requires expedited treatment. By Court policy, we expedite child custody matters, appeal bonds, Rule 40(b) motions and any case in which a motion for expedited treatment has been granted.

I have always taken the position that the Constitutional requirement of the two-term rule means that we expedite every case. However, no matter how good all of this sounds in theory, in practice, we simply cannot expedite everything. Again, whenever there is a dissent on the Division the cases slow down, or for that matter, whenever an opinion leaves an individual judge's office, that judge loses any ability to control the speed in which the case goes through the Court.

I noticed that Senator David Ralston and Senator Mary Margaret Oliver are also listed as authors on these bills. It may be that we need to set up a meeting to meet with Senator Ralston to discuss our concerns with these bills.

Please let me know your feelings along these matters.

Attachments

cc:	Chief Judge Gary B. Andrews